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I. Background 
Tax incentives are widely used by states and communities to attract new and 
relocating businesses and to assist existing firms undertake expansions. There are many 
opinions on the usefulness and effects of incentive-based economic development strategies 
and on the importance firms place on the local tax climate (and incentives) as a location 
decision factor. Many studies written prior to 1985 report that taxes (and tax incentives) 
have little, or no, effect on firm location decisions (Due 1961, Wasylenko 1981). Some 
more recent studies suggest a positive relationship exists between low taxes and firm 
location, especially at an intraregional level (Bartik 1985, Friedman et al., 1992). 
The interactions between communities demanding and firms supplying jobs can be 
viewed as a market in which rival locations offer large incentive packages to attract new 
firms and jobs (Blair et al., 1984, Gabe 1996). In this market there is competition between 
communities, and communities and firms negotiating over incentives engage in strategic 
behavior (Wolkoff 1992, Oechssler 1994, Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny 1996). Optimization 
models can be used to analyze the behavior of governments and firms in the incentive 
process. 
Governments (and political officials) often seek to increase the number of jobs and 
stimulate growth in the local economy, which increases the tax base and may increase an 
official's probability of reelection. Communities may offer incentives to capture the 
perceived benefits from increased local jobs and industrialization. Firms (and firm 
managers) act to maximize profits or size by finding the optimal location for new 
production, or by expanding capacity at an existing facility. Firms may request incentives 
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to offset more profitable opportunities to locate or expand in other locations. When the 
.. objectives of a government and firm are satisfied, and sufficient benefits from added jobs 
are allocated between both parties, the firm undertakes a project with incentive assistance. 
This paper develops models of government and firm behavior, and uses a logit 
model to predict a firm's probability of participating in a state-level tax incentive program. 
Our main objective is to provide a conceptual foundation that is consistent with incentives 
requested by firms and offered by the state of Ohio. An objective of the empirical analysis 
is to determine the characteristics that influence a firm's choice to apply for and a state's 
choice to offer tax incentives. The analysis addresses the question: under what 
circumstances are business expansions, relocations or start ups likely to involve tax 
incentives? The conceptual and empirical :frameworks provide insight into the underlying 
behavior of governments and firms in choosing to offer incentives and undertake projects 
with, and in other cases without, incentive assistance. 
Our intent in this paper is not to evaluate whether tax incentives have a significant 
impact on employment growth and locational decisions. Although other studies have 
analyzed the relationship between taxes and firm location and growth, our findings are not 
meant to support or reject any hypotheses related to taxes and firm location. Rather, the 
paper focuses on the incentive process itself, and not on the success or failure of incentive 
projects. The conceptual foundation is admittedly too simple to explain all aspects of the 
incentive process. For example, there are political and institutional factors that enter into 
the incentive process. Although these factors could be built into the model, they are 
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ignored here to highlight the economic decisions motivated by underlying optimizing 
' behavior. 
To formalize the actions of governments and firms, we utilize the concepts of a 
community's willingness to pay for jobs and a firm's cost of job creation. Both measures 
are determined by characteristics of the firm (and jobs they are likely to create) and the 
community where the project will occur. For instance, a community's willingness to pay 
for new local jobs is likely based on current levels of unemployment and market 
conditions, and characteristics of the new jobs and industry. Likewise, a firm's cost of job 
creation in a particular location is determined by its proximity to markets, the quality of 
the local labor force, and firm and sectoral technological factors. 
This paper looks at the relationships between projects that receive incentive 
assistance and attributes that are internal and external to the firm. Our findings suggest 
there is a negative relationship between a project's probability of receiving a tax incentive, 
and firm size and age. The probability of receiving tax assistance increases with project 
size, measured by promised new jobs. Average annual wages per worker in a county, the 
number of interstate miles in a county, and a county's environmental nonattainment status 
are negatively related to the probability of a project receiving a tax incentive. The county 
labor force size and the probability of receiving tax assistance are positively related. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II develops an underlying theoretical 
foundation that motivates the behavior of communities and firms in the incentive process. 
In section ID, we discuss the empirical model and present results of the lo git estimation. 
4 
The paper concludes with a discussion oflimitations of the model and empirical 
framework. 
II. Theoretical Foundation 
The incentive process is described in this section in terms of underlying community 
surplus and firm profit optimization models. 1 Oechssler (1994), and Wohlgemuth and 
Kilkenny ( 1996) analyzed the incentive process with an interest in optimal community 
response to incentive requests, given imperfect information about a firm's need for tax 
assistance. These studies treat the firm's incentive request as a signal of the firm's 
opportunity to locate in an alternative location. 
Oechssler (1994) motivates government behavior by community welfare 
maximization from tax revenues and jobs retained in the community (and possible political 
considerations). Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny (1996) assume that local officials maximize 
their probability of reelection through the provision of public goods, while maintaining 
horizontally equitable taxes across firms, subject to a government budget constraint. The 
objective of tax equity is motivated by local demands that all firms be treated equally in the 
receiving of tax incentives. Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny (1996) treat 'copy cat costs' as an 
important factor in a community's choice to offer a tax incentive to any particular firm. 
IL a Government Behavior 
In this paper, the government's choice to offer tax incentives is motivated by 
community surplus maximization. The surplus from any project is defined as the 
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community's willingness to pay for jobs from a particular firm in a given location, less any 
incentive that may be offered by the government. 2 The position and curvature of ro(.) with 
respect to L assume that promised, new jobs will be filled by residents with the highest 
social value of obtaining a job. 
Maximize: 
where, 
S = ro(L; Q) - I 
ro'L(L; Q) > Q 
ro(O; Q) ~ 0 
S = community's surplus from additional local jobs 
ro(.) = community's willingness to pay for jobs 
I = locational incentive 
L = number of jobs promised by firm 
n = firm and community characteristics 
(eq. 1) 
The community's underlying objective reveals implicit assumptions about 
government behavior related to the use of tax incentives. For example, governments may 
have a willingness to pay for certain jobs added to a local area. A community's 
willingness to pay for jobs is justified by the perceived benefits of increased 
industrialization and job creation in a community.3 In the State of Ohio, a criteria for 
receiving a Job Creation Tax Credit is that the "project is economically sound and will 
benefit the people of Ohio by increasing opportunities for employment." The state's 
willingness to pay for jobs represents an attempt to capture benefits that accrue to Ohio 
residents from increased employment opportunities. 
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The restrictions imposed on the origin and curvature of ro(L; 0) imply that the 
average willingness to pay for jobs decreases as the size of the project increases.4 For 
some projects, with ro(L; 0) less than zero, the government is unwilling to pay for jobs 
added to the community. In these cases, costs from additional congestion or 
environmental damage, or costs of extending local public goods and services outweigh any 
local benefits from additional jobs. 5 These projects are not worthy of tax incentives from 
the point of view of the community. More generally, any project that requires an incentive 
greater than the community's willingness to pay for jobs is unworthy of incentives. 
Another implication of the government's underlying objective function is the negative 
relationship between community surplus and incentive size. Other things equal, the 
community is better off attracting firms with the lowest possible incentive, or no incentive 
at all. 
IL b Firm Behavior 
Firm behavior is described in terms of the decision to allocate resources to a 
project that creates jobs in a specific location. The project may be a firm birth, expansion 
or relocation. The assumption that underlies firm behavior is that the firm will undertake a 
project if its expected profits are greater than the return from alternative activities. The 
firm chooses the most profitable activity from (1) pursuing a project in a baseline 
community, (2) pursuing a project in any other community, or (3) undertaking some 
alternative investment. 
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The firm's benefit from undertaking a project in any community is the increase in 
revenue from greater output produced by added labor and capital. Project costs are the 
payments to labor and capital added by the project. The benefits and costs to firms vary 
across locations according to differences in input costs, transportation costs and local 
markets. The opportunity cost of undertaking a project in any community is the firm's 
most profitable alternative activity. For example, if another community lowers the cost of 
labor through the provision of better public services without raising taxes, and all other 
things are equal, the opportunity cost of locating in the baseline community increases. 
The firm chooses its optimal allocation of resources between the set of alternative 
activities and pursuing a project in the baseline community. After deciding to expand its 
production capacity, the firm chooses the optimal location to invest its capital and 
undertake the project. The added capital, combined with labor, increases the firm's output 
and profits. The firm undertakes a project in the baseline community if: 
where, 
PYo - WoLo - RoK ~ PYA - WALA - RAK 
y = f(L, K) 
subscript 0 = baseline location 
subscript A = any alternative location 
P = output price (same in both locations) 
Y = output level (varies across locations 0 and A) 
W = wage rate (varies across locations 0 and A) 
L = labor added by firm (varies across locations 0 and A) 
R = rental rate of capital (varies across locations 0 and A) 
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(eq. 2) 
' ' ' ) 
K = capital stock (same in both locations) 
The size of the capital investment is determined by technological and industry-specific 
factors, and is assumed to be independent of the site chosen for the project. The firm 
chooses its optimal levels of output and labor, along with the location choice, based on the 
rental rate of capital, the wage rate and the output price in the baseline and alternative 
communities. In this manner, a firm chooses the site with the highest return to its capital, 
and creates jobs in that location. 
In instances where the community would receive a surplus from jobs added by a 
firm, the government may offer tax incentives to entice the firm to undertake a project in 
the area. The firm treats the incentive as a benefit in addition to the profit from 
undertaking a project. If the expected profits from a project in an alternative site are 
greater than in the baseline location, a tax incentive may influence a firm's allocation of 
resources from the alternative to the baseline community.6 It is unlikely, however, that an 
incentive could induce a firm to undertake a project that would have been otherwise 
unprofitable in terms of the increased revenues and costs. The incentive could play an 
important role in offsetting the firm's opportunity cost oflocating in another community, 
and may be more important to firms if alternative locations offer incentives as well. The 
firm's decision rule when incentives are available in the community is to pursue the project 
if: 
(eq. 3) 
Along with increasing the benefits of a project, the incentive process may also add 
a set of tangible and intangible transaction costs to the firm. These include information, 
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administrative, goodwill and intervention costs. The information cost includes efforts on 
the firm's behalf to learn about the incentive program. A firm that is uninformed about the 
program may have a prohibitively high cost of information and will never request an 
incentive. Firms also incur a tangible administrative cost when requesting tax incentives. 
This includes application costs and the expense of meeting with government officials to 
negotiate the size and terms of the incentive. 7 
The loss of community goodwill is an intangible cost that may arise in cases where 
the community's perception of the firm changes based on its request for a tax incentive. 
Residents in certain communities may view tax incentives as a form of corporate welfare. 
In these areas, requesting an incentive may decrease the level of goodwill a firm has in a 
community. 8 A second intangible cost of the incentive process is the possible increase in 
government awareness of, and intervention into, the firm's activities. An incentive request 
may require the firm to provide financial statements to the local government. 9 Also, after 
the incentive is awarded, the government may request information from the firm to 
monitor the success of the program. 
The firm's optimal decision rule takes into account the transactions costs that are 
incurred in the incentive process. To undertake a project with tax assistance from the 
baseline community, the incentive must offset any negative differential in profits between 
the baseline and alternative communities, and cover the incentive transactions costs. In 
other words, the incentive must be greater than the firm's cost of job creation in the 
baseline community. The cost of job creation is determined by a set of characteristics that 
affect the project's profitability in a particular location vis a vis other investments. The 
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cost of job creation increases as transactions costs rise. Likewise, the cost of job creation 
increases with the number of jobs added by the firm. This is a result of decreasing returns 
from adding a variable input (labor) to a fixed input (capital). If it is more profitable to 
locate in the baseline community than any alternative site, the cost of job creation is less 
than zero (and the firm will not require an incentive to locate in the baseline community). 
I ~ (PYA - WALA - RAK) - (PYo - WoLo - RoK) + C 
I ~ g(L; ®) 
(eq. 4) 
g(L; ®) = (PYA - WALA - RAK) - (PYo - WoLo - RoK) + C 
where, g(.) = firm's cost of job creation 
® = firm and community characteristics 
C = incentive transactions costs 
IL c Incentive Outcomes 
The underlying objectives of communities and firms motivate their actions during 
the incentive process. Three general outcomes are consistent with rational behaVior by 
both agents. First, the model suggests that some firms will undertake projects in the 
baseline community without requesting an incentive. In some cases, these firms do not 
have an attractive alternative investment, which lowers the project's opportunity cost. 
Firms will also undertake projects without assistance if transactions costs are high. 
Second, firms may request incentives and be denied assistance from the 
government. When this occurs, firms will either undertake the most profitable alternative 
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investment or complete the project in its original location. If the firm undertakes the 
project after being denied an incentive, the community infers that the incentive request was 
a bluff. If the firm undertakes an alternative investment, it signals that the return to capital 
is greater in the alternative location. In this case, the incentive would have allowed the 
firm to undertake the project locally. 10 Incentive requests denied by the government signal 
that the project would not have generated a surplus in the community or that the 
community leaders believe the firm is bluffing. 
A third outcome consistent with the model is that some firms will request 
incentives and receive tax assistance. For this to occur, the project must provide benefits 
to the community and firm. The allocation of benefits between the community surplus and 
firm profits is determined by which agent has more power during the incentive process. If 
the community has bargaining power (and perfect information), the government will offer 
incentives at the level where the community's marginal willingness to pay for jobs equals 
the firm's marginal cost of job creation, which provides the maximum surplus. 11 The 
community does not provide incentives to firms that are able to undertake projects 
without tax assistance. If firms have power in the incentive process, they are likely to 
request the maximum incentive the community is willing to pay. This results in a zero 
community surplus. 
It is not certain which agent has more power in the incentive process. The relative 
mobility of firms vis a vis communities and the keen competition between locations 
suggest that some firms have bargaining power. Furthermore, firms possess asymmetric 
information about whether they require an incentive to undertake a project. On the other 
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hand, the government has private knowledge of the community's benefit from new local 
jobs.12 The government also has information about its future plans to monitor tax 
incentives, and the likelihood that is will ultimately grant or deny a firm's incentive 
request. 
Regardless of which party holds more power in the incentive process, there are 
two criteria that must be met by any project receiving a tax incentive. First, the 
community must be willing to provide an incentive to the firm (meeting the nonnegative 
community surplus criteria). Second, the firm must be willing to undertake the project in 
return for the tax incentive (meeting the cost of job creation criteria). In summary, 
projects that receive incentives must meet both criteria. Projects fail to receive assistance 
because the community views the project as undesirable, and/or the cost of job creation is 
sufficiently large. 
III Empirical Specification 
Our underlying model of government and firm behavior suggests there is a set of 
firm and community characteristics that determine whether a project receives a tax 
incentive. The extent to which any project meets the community's willingness to pay and 
the firm's cost of job creation criteria is unobservable. We observe only whether a project 
receives a tax incentive, or whether the project occurs in the baseline region without 
incentive assistance. 
The variable Zi is an unobserved variable that indexes how closely a project meets 
the criteria for receiving a tax incentive. As suggested by the model, Zi is related to a set 
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(X = X1, ... ,Xn) of firm and community characteristics. The variable Zi* is a critical value 
of Zi that determines whether a project meets both criteria and receives an incentive. The 
variable 'f'i is an observed variable that equals one if a project receives an incentive, and 
zero ifthe project occurs without tax assistance. 
'f'i = 1, 
0, 
ifZi ~ Zi* 
otherwise 
A logit model estimates the probability that a project receives incentive assistance, given 
characteristics of the firm and community. 
where, 
1ti = Prob( 'f'i = 1) = {exp(~Xi) I (1 + exp(~Xi))} (eq. 5) 
1ti = project's probability of receiving a tax incentive 
'f'i = indicator variable that equals 1 if project receives incentive, 
zero otherwise 
Xi = a vector of firm and community characteristics 
Ill a Program Description and Data 
A logit model is used to analyze the relationship between a firm's probability of 
receiving an incentive from Ohio's Job Creation Tax Credit program, and selected firm 
and community characteristics. 13 The program provides a corporate tax credit that is 
equal to a percentage of the income taxes withheld from workers holding jobs created by 
the project. Larger tax credits (per promised job) are typically offered to firms that 
promise a large number of jobs, high wages, that purchase intermediate goods from Ohio 
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firms, or locate in "distressed" areas (Wasylenko 1996). The total incentive size, 
however, is closely related to the number of jobs promised by the firm. 
The data set consists of information regarding business establishments that 
announced major projects (as reported in Site Selection magazine) in Ohio between 1993 
and 1995. It is comprised of firms announcing projects that, in principle, would be 
candidates for receiving tax incentives from the state. The firm level data was collected in 
the 1997 Ohio State University Business Growth Survey, a questionnaire sent to 
approximately 1,000 firms that planned expansions between 1993 and 1995. From this 
survey, there were 494 usable responses. Site Selection lists projects that promise an 
investment of $1 million or more, a square footage increase greater than 20,000, or 50 or 
more new jobs. The projects are generally in the manufacturing or distribution sectors, 
though some office, research and development, retail, and hotel establishments are 
included. 
Of the 494 projects in the data set, 156 received a Job Creation Tax Credit in 
1993, 1994 or 1995. Tax incentives are generally restricted to manufacturing, 
distribution, research and development, and other high technology firms. Some conditions 
for receiving a tax credit are that the project creates new jobs, the project is "economically 
sound" and benefits Ohio residents, and the recipient firm must declare-that the incentive is 
a factor in the firm's decision to undertake the project. These conditions are consistent 
with the underlying model of state and firm behavior. If the project benefits Ohio 
residents, it is likely that the state government has a willingness to pay for the added jobs. 
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Illb Explanatory Vari.ables 
The variables expected to predict whether a project receives an incentive are the 
firm and community characteristics commonly used to explain firm growth and locational 
decisions. Other variables are chosen that may affect a community's willingness to pay for 
jobs or a firm's cost of job creation. The SIZE and AGE of a firm are likely to be 
correlated with its probability of receiving tax assistance. Young firms typically grow 
faster than older firms, and in most recent studies firm growth is negatively correlated with 
size (Evans 1987, Variyam and Kraybill 1992). Ohio's tax credit program is also believed 
to favor new and expanding firms (Wasylenko 1996). The higher levels of firm growth 
expected in young, small firms and the program's apparent bias toward small firms suggest 
that the firm age and size variables are negatively correlated with the probability of 
receiving an incentive. 
The PROJECT size is the number of jobs the firm promises to create in the 
community. The model suggests that total community benefits increase while the marginal 
benefit decreases with each added job. Furthermore, the firm's cost of job creation 
increases with each promised job. Since the project size increases the community's benefit 
from new jobs and the firm's cost of job creation, this variable is expected to be positively 
correlated with the probability of receiving tax assistance. 
The firm's RATE of employment change between 1990 and 1993 is expected to be 
negatively related to the probability of receiving an incentive. The rate of prior growth is 
the percentage change in establishment employment between 1990 and 1993. Growth 
between 1990 and 1993 without incentive assistance suggests that the firm's current 
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baseline location is (or at least was recently) profitable. On the other hand, if firm 
employment declined between 1990 and 1993, it is more likely that it would require an 
incentive to create jobs in the following period. 
The firm's INDUSTRY (by two-digit SIC) and TYPE (headquarters, branch plant 
or single location) are included as control variables in the logit analysis. The industry 
dummy variables are expected to capture the impacts of wages and job characteristics that 
vary across sectors. Firm type is expected to account for the differences in employment 
change and location decisions between single-unit enterprises and businesses that are part 
of a multi-establishment firm. Branch plant establishments may be more "footloose" and 
therefore more likely to be offered incentives than single establishments that are 
presumably tied to a particular location. 
Several community factors are expected to influence whether a project receives a 
tax incentive. County economic characteristics and market conditions in the project's 
location should affect the firm's cost of job creation. Also, given that the state's incentive 
program may have a bias toward financing projects in "distressed" areas, adverse local 
conditions should influence the government's willingness to pay for jobs in areas across 
the state. 
County-level EDUCATION attainment is likely to be negatively correlated with 
the probability of receiving a tax incentive. A highly educated local work force should 
lower a firm's cost of job creation and allow it to undertake a project without incentive 
assistance. Likewise, a poorly educated work force is likely to exist in distressed 
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communities, which suggests the state's willingness to pay for jobs increases the lower the 
local level of educational attainment. 
The county's DISTANCE from a metropolitan area and the miles of interstate 
HIGHWAY in the county are indicators of the firm's access to markets outside the 
community. Firms should have a lower cost of job creation in (or near) major markets or 
locations accessible to national markets via interstate highways. These firms are less likely 
therefore to request a tax incentive. 
County per capita money WAGES and the county UNEMPLOYMENT rate are 
indicators of an area's level of economic well being. As the county unemployment rate 
increases, the state is assumed to be more willing to pay for new jobs added in the county. 
This increases a project's probability of receiving tax assistance in areas with high 
unemployment. On the other hand, a high unemployment rate may decrease a firm's cost 
of job creation in the county, if high levels of unemployment decrease the reservation 
wage of local residents. This lowers a project's chance of receiving an incentive. Thus, 
we have no prior expectation on direction of the relationship between unemployment and 
the probability of receiving an incentive. The relationship between county per capita 
wages and a project's probability of receiving a tax incentive is also ambiguous. Areas 
with high money wages are generally less willing to pay for projects that may increase 
congestion and the demands for public services, since local wages are already high without 
the additional employment opportunities. 
The size of the county LABOR force is expected to positively impact the 
probability of a project receiving tax assistance. 14 The labor force size measures local 
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product and labor markets. As the labor force increases, the firm should have a larger 
pool of potential workers, which may decrease its cost of job creation. On the other hand, 
the state may have a greater willingness to pay for jobs added to more populated areas, if 
other yariables such as unemployment are constant. These areas may have a greater 
political significance than more sparsely populated counties. Since a large county work 
force is correlated with greater representation in the state legislature (and the possibility of 
the project potentially benefiting more people), projects in these areas may have a greater 
probability of receiving tax assistance. 
The environmental NONATTAINMENT status in each county is a dummy 
variable that indicates if local pollution levels exceed environmental standards for sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, lead and particulate matter less than 
ten milacrons in diameter. 15 Firms that emit these pollutants into the air may be forced to 
adopt costly technologies to reduce discharge levels. Thus, polluting firms may have a 
high cost of job creation in areas that do not meet attainment criteria. Clean firms may 
require incentives to locate in heavily polluted areas because of negative externalities. If 
pollution is a disamenity to management in nonpolluting firms, incentives from the state 
may increase the desirability of a location that is close to nonattainment status vis a vis 
other sites. From the state's perspective, the willingness to pay for jobs may be greater in 
nonattainment counties because of the difficulty of attracting jobs without incentives. 
Considering the relative strength of these factors, the probability of receiving an incentive 
is expected to increase in counties that do not meet attainment status. 
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Ill c Estimation Results 
The following model is used to estimate the relationship between a project's 
probability of receiving a tax incentive and a vector of firm and community characteristics 
related to the project. 
where, 
1ti = { exp(f3Xi) I ( 1 + exp(f3Xi))} 
1ti = project's probability of receiving a tax incentive 
f3X = f3o + f31AGE + f32PROJECT + f33SIZE + f34RATE + 
f3 5EDUCATION + f36WAGES + f31UNEMPLOYMENT + 
f38LABOR + f39DISTANCE + f310HIGHWAY + 
f311ATTAINMENT + f312,13TYPE + f314,1s, ... ,30,31INDUSTRY 
Two sets of dummy variables control for the relationships between firm type and industry, 
and the probability of receiving tax assistance. Firm type dummy variables indicate if the 
project is undertaken by a branch plant of a multi-establishment firm, or the headquarters 
of a multi-establishment firm. The omitted group includes single-unit establishments and 
businesses that are not classified. 16 The industry variables control for sector-specific 
effects. The service (SIC 60-67, 70-97) sector is the omitted category in the set of 
industry dummy variables. 
Descriptive statistics of the 494 projects announced in Ohio between 1993 and 
1995 are shown in table 1. They indicate that 32 percent of the projects (156 in total) 
received tax incentives. The average age of a firm undertaking a project is 21 years old, 
and the average size in 1993 (before the project) is 282 workers. The average project 
promises to add 77 new jobs. Firms in various industries undertook projects. The 
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industrial machinery and equipment (SIC 35), rubber and plastic products (SIC 30), and 
fabricated metal products (SIC 34) sectors, however, accounted for over 30 percent of the 
projects included in this paper. Table 2 presents the results of the logit analysis. The firm 
and community characteristics in our model are significantly correlated with ~ project's 
probability of receiving a tax incentive. The likelihood ratio for the set of explanatory 
variables is significant at the 99.9 percentile (chi-square value of 67.41 with 31 degrees of 
freedom). The model correctly predicts the outcome (whether a project receives an 
incentive, or whether it occurs in the state without assistance) of 72 percent of the 
projects. 
Firm age and size are negatively correlated with a project's probability of receiving 
a tax incentive. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that Ohio's tax incentive 
program favors small and young firms. At the margin, businesses that are 10 years older 
than the average establishment have a 2 percent lower probability of receiving tax 
assistance. Projects undertaken in establishments that have 100 more workers than the 
average are 1 percent less likely to receive a tax incentive. Thus, an establishment that 
began operations in 1955, with 600 employees at the beginning of 1993, has an almost 8 
percent lower chance of receiving tax assistance to undertake an expansion project than 
the "average" establishment. 17 
The project size, in terms of promised new jobs, is positively related to the 
probability of receiving tax assistance. This is consistent with assumptions in the model 
that the state has a higher willingness to pay for large projects, and that a firm's cost of job 
creation increases with the number of promised jobs. The estimates suggest that, at the 
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margin, a project has an 8 percent greater probability of receiving tax assistance for every 
100 promised jobs above the mean (77 jobs). Thus, a project promising 400 new jobs is 
approximately 25 percent more likely to receive assistance than a project that promises 75 
new jobs. 
The establishment's rate of employment change between 1990 and 1993 
significantly decreases a project's probability of receiving a tax incentive. This confirms 
our expectation that the incentive program favors establishments that have a net decrease 
in employment size (a sign of establishment distress) in the years before requesting an 
incentive. 
Several community characteristics are significantly correlated with the probability 
of a project receiving tax assistance. The annual wages per worker in a county, a county's 
number of interstate highway miles, and a county's nonattainment environmental status 
decrease a project's probability of receiving a tax incentive. The logit estimates suggest 
that for every $1,000 dollars (above the average of $10,278) in average annual county 
wages per worker, a project is 2.5 percent less likely to receive an incentive. This is 
consistent with the incentive program's objective of providing assistance to firms that 
undertake projects in distressed areas. 
The negative correlation between the number of interstate highway miles in a 
county and a project's probability of receiving tax assistance supports the hypothesis that 
greater market access decreases a firm's cost of job creation. The empirical estimates 
suggest that for every 10 additional miles of interstate highway in a county (above the 
average of 34), a project is 5 percent less likely to receive an incentive. The second 
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measure of market access, the county's distance from a major metropolitan area, is not 
significantly correlated with receiving an incentive. The relationship between 
environmental quality and the dependent variable suggests that projects in nonattainment 
counties are 11 percent less likely to receive tax assistance. This may suggest that, 
contrary to our expectations, the state has a lower willingness to pay for jobs added in 
nonattainment areas (or that a firm's cost of job creation is lower in nonattainment 
counties). 
The lo git estimates suggest a positive correlation exists between the size of the 
county labor force and a project's probability of receiving tax assistance. For every 
100,000 workers in a county (above the mean of 150,000), a project's probability of 
receiving an incentive increases by 10 percent. This finding may confirm the notion that 
projects in areas with greater political representation have a higher probability of receiving 
tax assistance from the state. 
The firm type and industry dummy variables are insignificant in explaining a 
project's probability ofreceiving an incentive. This suggests that incentives are not 
offered with more frequency to specific firm types or industries. 18 
IV. Conclusions and Model Limitations 
The empirical results suggest that the incentive projects undertaken by Ohio 
establishments are, for the most part, consistent with our assumed underlying state and 
firm optimization models. Firm size and age (although not firm type or industry), and 
project size are significantly related to a project's probability ofreceiving a tax incentive. 
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Likewise, the findings generally support the notion that incentives are used to assist firms 
that locate or expand in distressed areas. As a whole, the empirical results support our 
hypotheses about firm and community characteristics that influence the probability a 
project will receive tax assistance. 
There are, however, some weaknesses in the theoretical foundation and empirical 
model. First, the empirical model is unable to separate the effects of a community's 
willingness to pay for jobs and a firm's cost of job creation on a project's probability of 
receiving a tax incentive. 19 The community characteristics that affect a firm's cost of job 
creation in a county also influence the state's willingness to pay for jobs in that area. In 
some cases, a community characteristic (such as county educational attainment) increases 
both a firm's cost of job creation and the state's willingness to pay for jobs. Other factors, 
however, increase a firm's cost of job creation and decrease the community's willingness 
to pay for jobs. This leads to ambiguous expected relationships between community 
conditions and the probability of receiving tax assistance. For instance, other things being 
equal, high money wages in a county should increase a firm's cost of job creation and 
lower the state's willingness to pay for jobs. Our models of government and firm 
behavior, therefore, suggest opposing expected signs for the relationship between a 
project's probability of receiving an incentive and local money wages. Likewise, the 
conceptual framework does not suggest a clear-cut expected relationship between county 
labor force size and the probability of receiving an incentive. In these cases where the 
community and firm models suggest there are opposing forces, the result is an empirical 
question. The empirical result may imply, however, which factor (the community's 
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willingness to pay for jobs or the state's cost of job creation) is more important in the 
incentive process. 20 
A second weakness is that the model does not account for imperfect information 
that may arise in the incentive process, ignoring the problem of firms that request 
incentives but do not actually need them to undertake a project. If the assumption of 
perfect community information is valid, incentives are given only to projects with a 
positive cost of job creation. On the other hand, suppose that all firms are bluffing about 
their need for an incentive. In this extreme case, the empirical results may say more about 
a firm's ability to bluff than about its cost of job creation. 
A third weakness is that our analysis is limited to projects that occur with tax 
incentives and projects that firms undertake without incentive assistance. We do not have 
information on firms that request incentives but are denied them by the state government. 
Some of the businesses that undertook projects without assistance likely requested 
incentives from the state and were turned down. Incorporating information on the 
decisions made by firms that are denied incentives would enable us to analyze a second 
component of the incentive process. The process could be expanded to capture the firm's 
decision to apply for an incentive, the state's decision to grant an incentive, and the firm's 
choice to undertake the project (with or without tax assistance). The model currently 
explains a firm's decision to apply for and accept, and a government's decision to offer, 
tax incentives. 
Although these weaknesses are not insignificant, they do not detract from 
achieving the original objectives ofthis paper. We have laid out a conceptual foundation 
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that suggests incentive projects must meet a community's (or state's) nonnegative surplus 
criterion and a firm's cost of job creation. We find that tax incentive outcomes are largely 
consistent with our model and with economic development objectives in the state of Ohio. 
The empirical results are consistent with the notion that the incentive program favors 
young and small firms, that incentives are more frequently given to firms that promise a 
large number of jobs, and that incentives are used to stimulate expansions and firm 
location in depressed areas. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Standard 
Variable Mean Deviation 
Incentive 0.32 NA 
Firm Age 21.32 26.15 
Project Size 76.70 125.99 
1993 Employment Size 281.89 958.21 
1990 - 1993 Rate of Employment Change 0.29 0.59 
Education 12.33 0.40 
Average Annual Wages 10,278 3,739 
County Unemployment 6.85 1.45 
County Labor Force 150,000 211,000 
Distance from Metropolitan area 15.44 15.52 
Interstate Highway Mileage 34.46 36.74 
Environmental Nonattainment 0.53 NA 
Branch Plant 0.44 NA 
Headquarters 0.12 NA 
Single Unit Establishment 0.41 NA 
Other Establishment 0.04 NA 
'. ' 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (cont'd) 
Industry Percentage 
Services (SIC 70-97) 2.83% 
FIRE (SIC 60-67) 1.42% 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (SIC 50-59) 9.11% 
Transportation and Public Utilities (SIC 40-49) 1.42% 
Food and Kindred Products (SIC 20) 4.45% 
Textiles (SIC 22-23) 0.61% 
Lumber, Wood, Furniture and Fixtures (SIC 24-25) 2.63% 
Paper and Allied Products (SIC 26) 5.26% 
Printing and Publishing (SIC 27) 2.83% 
Chemicals and Petroleum Products (SIC 28-29) 4.25% 
Rubber and Plastic Products (SIC 30) 11.54% 
Leather Products (SIC 31) 0.41% 
Stone, Clay and Glass Products (SIC 32) 4.45% 
Primary Metal Industries (SIC 33) 6.28% 
Fabricated Metal Products (SIC 34) 10.32% 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment (SIC 35) 15.79% 
Electronic Equipment (SIC 36) 5.87% 
Transportation Equipment (SIC 37) 8.70% 
Instruments and Related Products (SIC 38) 1.01% 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing (SIC 39) 0.81% 
t' ' 
Table 2. Logit Results 
Asymptotic Asymptotic 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio Marsinal Effect 1 
Constant -9.925 6.824 -1.454 -1.861 
Firm Age -0.012 0.005 -2.490- -0.023 
(10) 
Project Size 0.004 0.001 3.582- 0.080 
(100) 
1993 Employment Size -0.001 3.08E-04 -1.935* -0.011 
(100) 
1990 - 1993 Rate of Employment Change -0.327 0.194 -1.687* -0.061 
Education 0.854 0.536 1.593 0.160 
Average Annual Wages -1.34E-04 5.68E-05 -2.365- -0.025 
(1,000) 
Unemployment 0.053 0.102 0.521 0.010 
Labor Force 7.36E-06 1.61E-06 4_555- 0.001 
(1,000) 
Distance 0.006 0.010 0.588 0.001 
Interstate Highway Mileage -0.027 0.009 -3.170- -0.051 
(10) 
Environmental Nonattainment -0.627 0.315 -1.992* -0.118 
Branch Plant 0.194 0.235 0.825 0.036 
Headquarters 0.100 0.364 0.274 0.019 
Likelihood Ratio = 67.41- with 31 degrees of freedom 
* Significant at 10% level 1 Calculated at mean values 
- Significant at 5% level 
.. ' 
Table 2. Logit Results (cont'd) 
Asymptotic Asymptotic 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio Marainal Effect1 
Wholesale and Retail Trade -0.984 0.623 -1.579 -0.185 
Transportation and Public Utilities -0.146 0.941 -0.156 -0.027 
Food and Kindred Products -0.540 0.688 -0.785 -0.101 
Textiles -31.850 3.70E+06 -8.61 E-06 -5.973 
Lumber, Wood, Furniture and Fixtures -1.595 1.049 -1.520 -0.299 
Paper and Allied Products 0.589 0.646 0.913 0.111 
Printing and Publishing -0.114 0.782 -0.146 -0.021 
Chemicals and Petroleum Products -0.034 0.681 -0.049 -0.006 
Rubber and Plastic Products -0.018 0.569 -0.032 -0.003 
Leather Products 0.380 1.721. 0.221 0.071 
Stone, Clay and Glass Products -0.037 0.677 -0.055 -0.007 
Primary Metal Industries 0.166 0.615 0.270 0.031 
Fabricated Metal Products -0.734 0.592 -1.241 -0.138 
Industrial Machinery and Equipment -0.543 0.552 -0.982 -0.102 
Electronic Equipment 0.086 0.627 0.137 0.016 
Transportation Equipment -0.466 0.608 -0.767 -0.087 
Instruments and Related Products -0.302 1.101 -0.274 -0.057 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 0.841 1.133 0.742 0.158 
1 Calculated at mean values 
Notes 
1. The incentive process is loosely defined as the request for, offer of, or acceptance of a 
tax incentive by local communities and firms. 
2. This general behavioral assumption is consistent with the incentive process outlined by 
Oechssler (1994), and Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny (1996). For example, a copy cat cost 
could be incorporated along with the incentive as a second component that decreases the 
community surplus. 
3. Blair et al., (1984) motivate government behavior in the "market for jobs" on the bases 
of imperfect labor markets and economic stagnation in a region. In areas with some 
threshold level of unemployment, "(workers) should be willing to pay (for jobs) up to the 
costs - both monetary and psychic - of relocating for a comparable local job" (Blair et al., 
p.66). Benefits from local jobs may spread beyond affected workers to some property 
owners and, in the case where new jobs are in basic sectors, to other local businesses and 
residents through the multiplier process. Blair et al., also suggest the community's 
willingness to pay for jobs should vary across regions depending on their level of 
unemployment, public service and infrastructure capacity, and other factors. 
4. This is consistent with the decreasing marginal social benefit from additional jobs 
assumed by Blair et al., (1984). 
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5. This notion expands lhlanfeldt's (1995) first principle of offering effective and fair tax 
incentives. It states that "tax incentives should be accompanied by specific programs that 
seek to mitigate the unwanted side effects of economic growth." In our study, 
governments are assumed to have a negative willingness to pay for projects for which the 
unwanted side effects outweigh the external benefits. Thus, the underlying behavior 
predicted by the model is that tax incentives are not (or should not be) offered to firms 
undertaking projects with net negative external effects. 
6. Even ifthe baseline community provides the most profitable location for the project, 
firms may benefit by receiving an incentive . This causes the information problem 
analyzed by Oechssler (1994), and Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny (1996). Firms without an 
attractive alternative investment (which translates into a low opportunity cost) have an 
incentive to seek tax assistance by acting as if they have a relocation opportunity. A 
weakness of our model is that it is impossible to distinguish whether a firm receiving an 
incentive actually requires it to undertake a project, or whether a community merely 
entertained its bluff 
7. The administrative costs are similar to lobbying costs defined by Oechssler (1994) as 
spending in a media campaign, taking government officials to dinner, etc. 
8. A firm's reputation can be hurt even in cases when they request and are denied a tax 
incentive. If a firm undertakes a project locally after being denied an incentive, the 
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community learns that the incentive request was a bluff. This may adversely affect future 
relations between the community and firm. 
9. In Oechssler's (1994) model, a policy instrument at the government's disposal is the 
decision whether to audit a firm that requests an incentive. An equilibrium in Oechssler' s 
firm versus city subsidy game is to respond to a firm's subsidy lobby with a random 
strategy of offering an incentive and auditing the firm. 
10. This assumes that a firm will not request an incentive less th8.n its cost of job creation. 
11. Offering incentives at this level assumes that projects are continuous in nature. In 
reality, jobs are added in discrete levels. Therefore, it is unlikely that any project will 
occur at the point where the marginal willingness to pay equals the marginal cost of job 
creation (which maximizes the community surplus) or where the incentive size equals the 
community's willingness to pay for jobs (which maximizes a firm's profit and provides a 
zero community surplus). 
12. Though a formal economic analysis may not be conducted by community leaders, they 
inevitably undertake their own informal calculation about the political benefits of job 
creation. 
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13. The Ohio Job Tax Credit Program is explained by Wasylenko (1996) and Gabe 
(1996). 
14. The community and firm models suggest the expected relationship between labor force 
size and the probability of receiving assistance is ambiguous. It is likely that a large labor 
force decreases a firm's cost of job creation. The relationship between the state's 
willingness to pay for jobs and the county labor force, on purely economic grounds, is 
uncertain. The county labor force, which is closely related to the area's population size, is 
probably more important politically at the state level. We expect that the political factors 
that increase the probability of receiving an incentive outweigh the economic factors that 
decrease a firm's cost of job creation. 
15. McConnell and Schwab (1990) found no correlation between industrial location 
decisions and attainment or nonattainment status. They did find (taking into account the 
degree of environmental distress) that firms are less likely to locate in areas with heavy 
ozone pollution. 
16. The survey instrument asked the respondent to choose the firm's type between (a) 
branch plant of a multi-establishment firm, (b) headquarters of a multi-establishment firm, 
( c) single unit establishment, or ( d) other. The omitted group contains single unit 
establishments and the 4 percent of firms that are classified in the "other" category. 
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17. The economic significance of these results is uncertain. An establishment must be 50 
years older, or 1,000 workers larger, than the average establishment to be 10 percent less 
likely to receive incentive assistance. Fifty years older than the average establishment 
represents two standard deviations from the mean. One thousand additional workers in 
1993 is almost one standard deviation from mean values. 
18. These results will be tested further in a future revision of this paper. Likelihood ratio 
tests would indicate whether the dummy variables are significant as a group. 
19. In other words, the empirical model is unable to separate supply and demand factors 
that influence whether a project receives incentive assistance. Modeling the incentive 
process as a market for jobs (with incentive prices and job quantities) would enable us to 
isolate the effects of firm and community characteristics on incentive demand and supply. 
20. This may be useful in determining which party holds more power in the incentive 
process. 
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